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ABSTRACT 
 
William Beaver: Revolutionary Ideas 
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson) 
 
 When does the opposition remove long serving incumbents from power, or steal 
the presidency from an autocrat’s chosen successor? Three prominent theories seek to 
answer this question.  Bunce and Wolchik (2009a) argue that for the opposition to win 
power they must use certain strategies, Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) argue that they 
win power when the autocratic regime has certain attributes, and Hale (2005) argues it 
only happens when elites expect the president to be leaving power.  I apply these theories 
to cases in the former Soviet Union where the opposition won power and where it did 
not.  None of these theories adequately explain each case.  A better explanation combines 
and adds to the conclusions I arrive at from testing these theories. Protests give elites 
information.  Depending on the information that elites receive, elites will either defect 
and join the opposition, or continue supporting the president.  If elites defect, then the 
president will have difficulty winning elections, giving the opposition the opportunity to 
win the presidency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The BBC filmed a documentary titled How to Plan a revolution in 2005.  It 
follows two young men in Azerbaijan named Emin Huseynov, the founder of a youth 
group called Maqam (Enough) and Murad Gasanly, an advisor to the opposition bloc 
Azadliq (Freedom). The documentary begins two months before the 2005 parliamentary 
elections in Azerbaijan. Preparations are well underway for the opposition to attempt to 
overthrow the incumbent, Ilham Aliyev, using strategies similar to the ones that were 
used to over through incumbents in Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, and Ukraine in 
2004.  Emin and Murad are involved in the same activities that Kmara, a youth group in 
Georgia, used to mobilize voters against the autocratic incumbent.  They are spray 
painting Azadliq (freedom) around Baku and distributing orange leaflets, orange tee-
shirts, and other orange paraphernalia, mimicking the Ukrainian revolution and 
encouraging Azeris to vote and mobilize against the regime in case of fraudulent 
elections.    
As expected, the government committed mass fraud during the elections.  The 
ruling party won 58 out of 125 seats in the in parliament, the Milli Meclis. Pro-
government, independent candidates won another 42 seats, leaving only seven for the 
opposition.  Opposition forces, led by Azadliq, mobilized their supporters to protest 
against the fraudulent results.  Like in Ukraine and Georgia, the opposition called for the 
president to resign and for the elections to be re-run.  They began non-stop protests on 26 
November 2005, claiming that they would not leave Galaba Square until their demands 
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were met (Valiyev 2006).  In Ukraine and Georgia, protests continued to grow after the 
opposition took this drastic step.  In Azerbaijan, the protests were crushed.   Why were 
autocrats or their successors removed in Georgia, Ukraine, and, later, Kyrgyzstan?  Why 
was Ilham Aliyev able to stay in power in Azerbaijan?  
In this paper, I examine why opposition groups are able to win power in the 
former Soviet Union. In six states in the former Soviet Union, autocrats have recently 
experienced stiff challenges to their continued rule.  In three states, Georgia (2003), 
Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), an opposition leader wrested the presidency 
from a long serving incumbent or his chosen successor.  In three other states, Armenia 
(2003, 2008), Azerbaijan (2003, 2005), and Belarus (2006) the incumbent kept control of 
the government or successfully handed the presidency to a chosen successor.  These cases 
have challenged and given rise to speculation about the engine driving authoritarian 
incumbents out of power and opposition groups into power.  The answers scholars have 
given to this question are diverse and do not form a consensus.  In this paper I have 
chosen to examine three theories that represent dominant and divergent views on the 
causes of what has become known as the Color Revolutions.  
Two of the theories are part of a contentious debate that took place in a special 
issue of the Journal of Democracy.1 Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik (2006, 2009b, 
2009a, 2010a, 2010b), credit a bundle of electoral strategies that have spread and been 
implemented throughout post communist space with overthrowing incumbent autocrats 
or their successors. The theory was built from earlier electoral breakthroughs in central 
and Eastern Europe. The second theory takes the opposite stance and values the structural 
characteristics of authoritarian regimes. According to Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) 
                                                 
1
 See Journal of Democracy, January 2009  
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civil society and opposition movements are weak in the former Soviet Union, so regime 
strength better determines whether or not the opposition will be able to win power. The 
third is an interesting mix: Henry Hale (2005, 2006) finds that the durability of the 
regime and the opposition’s ability to replace autocrats both stem from a single source: 
the autocrat himself.       
 I begin by describing each hypothesis in detail.  I identify their similarities and 
differences and show how to determine how well each one accounts for the opposition’s 
success or failure in gaining power.  I then apply each theory to the cases I identified 
above: Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Kyrgyzstan (2005), Azerbaijan (2003) (2005), 
Armenia (2003/4) 2008), and Belarus (2006).  From testing these theories I draw two 
conclusions.  Hale’s (2005) theory best predicts which autocrats or their successors will 
survive challenges from the opposition and which will fall.  However, the evidence only 
supports part of his theory.  I then offer an alternative hypothesis that is chiefly based on 
Hale’s theory, but incorporates elements of the other two hypotheses.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
Hale views regime stability in the former Soviet Union from a high altitude. He 
focuses on the general nature of the region’s regimes and why that nature makes the 
autocrat himself so important in determining a regime is stable or unstable.  The region’s 
dominant regime type is patronal presidential.  In these systems a president’s power 
dwarfs the power of the other branches of government.  This allows the president to make 
decisions and to use the state’s resources with little oversight.  Depending on the 
president’s actual power vis-à-vis other branches, formal presidential powers can be used 
to punish enemies and reward allies with posts, privileges, subsidies, monopoly rights, 
etc.  The formal powers the president has access to are complemented by his informal 
control over the economy.  In the former Soviet Union, presidential systems have created 
conditions where economic reform and privatization have gone slowly (Hellman 1998).  
As a result, many governments, and through them, presidents, control access to vast, state 
controlled resources.      
Hale argues that patronal presidential regimes go through cyclical phases which 
consist of periods of consolidation and contestation.  In a consolidation phase there are 
few challenges to the authoritarian regime because of the president’s vast powers.  His 
formal and informal control over the government and economy allows him to reward his 
allies and punish any elites willing to challenge his rule.  When elites expect a president 
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to be leaving power, however, he has a more difficult time controlling them.  This creates 
conditions where there is greater contestation between the state’s political forces.  The 
office of the president is powerful, so when elites expect the president to be leaving 
power, they rally around whoever they think is going to be the next president.  There 
usually is not a consensus among elites as to who they think the next president is going to 
be, so the contestation phase is filled with uncertainty, and political resources are not 
concentrated in support of any one person.  In these conditions, the opposition has a 
much better chance of winning elections than at other times because elites may be willing 
to support their efforts. The government also does not have access to its usual resources.  
Additionally, the president’s elite allies are less likely to obey his orders to crack down 
on the regime’s enemies because they do not know if their behavior will be rewarded or 
punished after the president leaves power.  During this time, the president’s popularity 
determines if his chosen successor is elected to power.   
Contrary to Hale’s view that authoritarian regime stability fluctuates depending 
on elite assumptions, Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) lay out criteria to measure their 
nuanced view of authoritarian regime stability.  It depends on four key factors: ties to 
(linkage) and ‘leverage’ from democracy promoters, the characteristics of a state’s 
security forces, and the characteristics of the parties supporting the incumbent autocrat.  
If an authoritarian state has dense ties to powerful democracy promoters like the US and 
the EU, it is more likely to become democratic.  This is because increased interactions 
with liberal democratic states augment the scrutiny an autocrat faces. It also raises the 
costs of partaking in irregular and illegal behavior that would give them the edge they 
need to dominate a polity in a semi-democratic environment. When these ties are 
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thickest, they lead to previously illiberal states democratizing.  In the former Soviet 
Union (excluding Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), no states have ties dense enough to 
make these democratizing effects felt.  Instead, states are scrutinized only during certain 
periods; namely elections.  Elections are easily observable and are ubiquitously used as a 
way to gauge a state’s progress towards democracy.    
Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) argue that states without high linkage to 
democratic countries will not democratize themselves.  However, if liberal democratic 
countries are in positions where they have leverage in their relationship to low linkage 
states, they are still able to deter overt autocratic behavior.  For example, when an 
autocratic regime faces mobilized protesters, the government is less likely to sanction the 
use of force to disperse them because they fear repercussions from the international 
community.  Authoritarian states are designated as being vulnerable to leverage the 
poorer they are and the weaker their military is.  
There are two other factors that give liberal democratic states more or less 
leverage to punish and reward authoritarian regimes: the strategic importance of the 
authoritarian state and the presence of a regional power that is willing to support their 
weaker neighbor.  When a state is strategically important to democracy promoters, there 
are other foreign policy objectives that supersede democracy promotion.  Strategically 
important states may produce natural resources like oil and natural gas that the US or EU 
is dependent upon. Or the US or EU may value the state’s cooperation on issues unrelated 
to democratization like the war on terror (Pakistan).  A specific, regional example of a 
state that is of strategic interest to the US is Tajikistan.  Tajikistan’s GDP was a paltry 
5.13 billion dollars in 2008 (World Bank 2010), and their military has not recovered from 
7 
 
a civil war that took place in the 1990s.  As a result, Tajikistan would be a high leverage 
country except for its location on the border of Afghanistan.  Instead of chastising 
Tajikistan’s government for conducting elections that failed to meet any of their OSCE 
commitments in 2010, the US is seeking closer ties with the central Asian state to ensure 
its continued stability (Economist 2010).   
Tajikistan’s government and other authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet 
Union also benefit from Russia’s presence.  Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) call Russia 
a black knight. Democratic leverage over authoritarian states is decreased when black 
knights, regional powers like Russia or China, support their weaker neighbors. In the 
former Soviet Union, Russia supports states through loans, investment, and military aid.  
This makes states them less vulnerable to western pressure because they have alternative 
avenues to pursue if they are in need of aid, and Russian training and arms can buttress 
their militaries.    
Domestically, authoritarians depend on the characteristics of the security forces 
and ruling party for stability.  Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) argue that a state’s 
security forces are stronger or weaker depending upon its scope and cohesiveness. The 
security forces have scope when they are well funded, trained, and spread throughout the 
entire country.  A coercive apparatus with high scope is able to raise the cost of 
supporting the opposition.  This keeps support for the opposition weak, which makes the 
state less likely to face any serious challenges. Cohesion measures how likely the security 
forces are to follow controversial orders like firing on crowds or violently dispersing 
protesters.  When security forces are more cohesive, then they will have no trouble 
putting down stiff challenges to authoritarian rule.   
8 
 
Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) also look at the scope and cohesiveness of a 
state’s ruling party to determine its stability.  If a party has higher cohesiveness elites are 
less likely to defect to the opposition.  This contributes to regime stability because the 
stiffest challenges usually come from former insiders who use their ill gotten gains to 
challenge and try to win power, a claim reinforced by Geddes (2009) and Brownlee 
(2004).  According to Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) parties also increase the time 
horizons of elites.  Posts and rewards are distributed systematically through the party 
depending on one’s standing, and there is a promise of further advancement for elites in 
the future.  The party’s scope is its presence throughout the country and its levels of mass 
membership.  If a party is spread throughout the country and it has high levels of 
membership it can mobilize voters to win elections and it will have an easier time 
committing fraud.  
This theory struck me as very similar to Hale’s (2005, 2006) when I first 
examined it.  They both agree that authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet Union are 
not likely to democratize. Hale, because patronal presidential regimes don’t change 
unless they stop being patronal presidential regimes. Levitsky and Way’s (forthcoming) 
because leverage is not able to cause a state to democratize, only linkage to liberal 
democratic states.  They also agree that elite defection can debilitate an authoritarian 
regime, and that defection is likely when an autocrat secures loyalty through patron-client 
relationships. However, there are two key differences that I would like to emphasize: 
their views on regime stability and on leadership succession.   
 For Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) if a regime is unstable, it is unstable all the 
time.  If it is stable, then that is its constant state.  I outlined the chief characteristics that 
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Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) argue affect the stability of a regime and how their 
presence or absence strengthens or weakens the regime above.  Briefly, if an autocrat has 
a ruling party with scope and cohesion, elites are less likely to defect to the opposition. 
Also, the president and his party are likely to win elections because they can more easily 
mobilize voters and commit fraud.  As long as there is a ruling party, the regime’s 
vulnerability does not change.  The same goes for the security forces. If they have high 
scope and cohesion all the time, then they are always going to be able to keep support for 
the opposition low, protests small, and the regime will be able to use force to suppress 
them.  In contrast, Hale (2005, 2006) argues that a ruling party will not keep elites in line 
during certain times, a period of contestation.  The security forces are also going to be 
willing to crackdown on protesters at any time, as long as the incumbent is not a lame 
duck.  When testing these theories, I will be looking to see if regimes are vulnerable and 
fall at anytime, in which case Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) would be correct, or if 
they are only vulnerable during  one of Hale’s contestation phases.   
 Hale (2005) and Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) disagree on when a regime is 
vulnerable.  They also disagree as to what exactly makes a regime vulnerable.  The party 
and security forces level of cohesion determines how likely elite defection is.  Hale 
agrees that elite defection is important.  However, Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) add 
that the party’s and security force’s scope also affects a regime’s vulnerability.  While it 
would be difficult to test whether a party’s scope makes a regime more stable, the effects 
of the security force’s scope are easily observable. Regimes with high scope have agents 
throughout the country that are able to harass potential supporters of the opposition.  This 
raises the costs of supporting opposition groups and helps the regime to preempt 
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opposition challenges.2 To test the importance of the security force’s scope, I will be 
looking to see if the size of the protests are affected by this characteristic.   
Regardless of the presence or absence of the characteristics Levitsky and Way 
(forthcoming) argue make an authoritarian regime stable, most autocrats are forced out of 
or choose to leave power at some point.  During these times, or in Hale’s vernacular 
when the incumbent is a lame duck, Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) argue that a ruling 
party smoothes the tricky process of transferring power to a chosen successor.   This 
argument may complement Hale’s.  Hale’s argument focuses on regime cycles and only 
vaguely specifies who will win power when there is a period of contestation. He argues 
that when an autocrat is leaving power, there is more contestation because elites do not 
know who to support. This opens up domestic political processes and provides space for 
mass preference to matter.  The outcome is contingent upon mass preference.  If an 
incumbent is extremely unpopular then he will be removed and his chosen successor will 
not gain power. To test if Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) are right, I will look at if the 
presence of a party facilitates succession when the incumbent is a lame duck. 
Bunce and Wolchik (2006, 2009b, 2009a, 2010a, 2010b) argue that the opposition 
wins power when they use a set of strategies called the electoral model that diffused 
throughout the region.  Their evidence is the nature of the spread of the oppositions’ 
breakthroughs and their clustering over time and space.  The electoral revolutions began 
in the late 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe where conditions were favorable.  The 
model was followed closely and spread quickly throughout the region.  It then jumped to 
Serbia and Croatia in 2000 where it was instituted in more authoritarian contexts.  The 
strategies that were developed in Serbia spread to the former Soviet Union.    
                                                 
2
 For a specific example see Silitski (2005).  
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This paper is on electoral breakthroughs in the former Soviet Union so I focus on 
the strategies that were used and diffused in the latter part of the diffusion cycle.  Even 
though the specific strategies had shifted to be effective in the oppressive states of the 
former Soviet Union, the spirit and implementation of the strategies did not stray from 
the model’s original goals.  The goal of the electoral model is to forge the normally weak 
and diffuse efforts of citizens, political parties, and democracy promoters into a force 
powerful enough to unseat authoritarian incumbents during or right after elections; the 
core elements can be organized accordingly.  To constitutionally remove autocrats, states 
and international organizations pressure foreign governments to reform elections.  Most 
importantly, they urge governments to give opposition groups positions on the Central 
Electoral Commission (CEC) and they threaten and cajole them to conduct fair elections 
with minimal fraud and coercion.  Combined with these international efforts are domestic 
ones to ‘get out the vote’ and to actually win the elections.  These strategies include large 
scale voting and registration drives, aggressive campaigning outside of major cities, 
uniting the opposition, creating youth groups, forming ties between civil society and the 
opposition, attracting voters using rock concerts, street theater, and by distributing posters 
and tee shirts.  Finally, election monitoring is used to deter fraud from occurring and 
publicizing it if it does.  Conducting parallel vote tabulation, opinion polls, and exit polls 
expose fraud and make it more likely that people will protest against the regimes efforts 
to unconstitutionally hold on to power.  These strategies travel through transnational 
diffusion networks that are made up of international democracy promoters (for example 
NDI, IRI, and Soros funded organizations), regional democracy promoters (especially 
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those from states where authoritarian regimes were successfully removed), and local 
activists.   
 Bunce and Wolchik (2009a) argue diffusion of these electoral strategies during a 
certain period led to the opposition successfully overthrowing autocrats in Georgia and 
Ukraine.  Similar to Levitsky and Way (forthcoming), Bunce and Wolchik (2009a) view 
the diffusion of the electoral model as causally significant in and of itself: If the electoral 
model best predicts when regime’s fall, then there is evidence that it alone can explain 
regime change.  If there is no evidence that it is effective in and of itself, I will examine 
how it interacts with the other theories. For example, is  the electoral model only 
effective when autocratic regimes are unstable, as measured by Levitsky and Way 
(forthcoming), or is it the deciding factor during one of Hale’s (2005, 2006) contestation 
phases.    
 I summarized the three theories that I am testing: Hale’s (2005, 2006) regime 
cycle theory, Levitsky and Way’s (forthcoming) regime strength theory, and Bunce and 
Wolchik’s diffusion theory.  I also laid out the differences between each of the theories 
and broadly outlined how it would be possible to differentiate which one or ones best 
account for the opposition winning power in the former Soviet Union. Levitsky and Way 
(forthcoming) and Bunce and Wolchik (2009a) both argue that the characteristics they 
isolate are causally significant in and of themselves.  Hale identifies when regimes are 
unstable, and specifies that the incumbent’s popularity decides if his successor ascends to 
the presidency.   
To determine which theory is superior, I first look to see how well it does when 
applied to every case.  If one theory is able to account for each and every one of the 
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cases, then that theory is best.  Second, I look at when incumbents are overthrown.  Hale 
argues that they are only overthrown when elites assume the incumbent is leaving power.  
Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) and Bunce and Wolchik (2008) both argue that 
incumbent’s can be overthrown at anytime.  Third, I look at the direct impact of the 
mechanisms that each author argues are important.  Examples include looking not just at 
whether a state is weak or strong according to Levitsky and Way (forthcoming), but 
whether the security forces scope inhibits mass mobilization.  For the effects of diffusion, 
I do not just determine if the electoral model is present or absent, but if participation in 
elections and the amount of protesters go up when it is used.  Through showing the 
differences and distinctions between each of the theories in this section, and outlining 
how they can be rated as better or worse than their rivals, I set the stage for actually 
testing each theory.  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
To test these theories across the cases I’ve chosen, I’ve operationalized them 
using Hale’s (2005) and Levitsky and Way’s (forthcoming) recommendations.  For 
Bunce and Wolchik’s (2009a), I do not only look at the presence or absence of the 
strategies that are part of the electoral model, but also their effects.   
 Hale (2005) argues that elites defect and cause a period a period of contestation to 
begin when they expect the incumbent to leave power.  An incumbent is expected to 
leave power when he sick or dying, when he announces he will leave power, because of 
term limits, or because he is very unpopular.  If the incumbent has any of these 
characteristics, then I code him as being a lame duck.  Hale (2005) also argues that an 
incumbent’s popularity differentiates a lame duck that is able to successfully transfer 
power to his chosen successor from one that is not. If his popularity is low, then his 
chosen successor has to depend on his own popularity to be elected.  So, I also score an 
incumbent as unpopular or not.   
Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) argue that there are six attributes that determine 
a regime’s strength or weakness: linkage, leverage, the scope and cohesion of the ruling 
party, and the scope and cohesion of the security forces.  States in the former Soviet 
Union, excluding the Baltic States, are low linkage. When a state is low linkage, the 
scope and cohesion of the security forces and ruling party chiefly determine a regime’s 
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stability.   Leverage is also included and can make a regime more or less stable, but the 
security forces and the party are the most important determinants.   
To measure leverage I look at a state’s per capita GDP and the state of their 
military.  If it has a healthy, robust economy, and a military that is strong enough to 
provide a deterrent to adventurous democracy promoters, then the state is low leverage.  
If the state holds the opposite of these characteristics it is high leverage unless Russia is 
willing to support it. In the former Soviet Union, Russia is the chief regional power and is 
perfectly happy to support states within its self defined sphere of influence.  
Unsurprisingly, this sphere of influence encapsulates most of the states in the former 
Soviet Union, excluding the Baltics.  Russia’s support of states in its sphere depends on 
its relationship to these states. If the relationship is poor and there is not a history of 
Russia providing support then it is high leverage, if the military and economy are weak.  
A state is also scored as low leverage if has abundant natural resources like oil and 
natural gas, or if the US needs the state’s cooperation, for example, in the war against 
terrorism. 
The scope and cohesion of the ruling party and the security forces are each 
measured separately with a score of one to three.  The scope of the ruling party depends 
on how widespread mass membership is, and if the party has a presence in all parts of the 
country.  If the ruling party has both these characteristics then it is scored as a three; if the 
party has a presence throughout the country, but does not have mass membership it is 
scored as a two; and if it has neither then, it is scored as a one.  A ruling party has strong 
cohesion (a score of three) when there is a single ruling party, and when there is 
something else besides patronage tying the members to the autocrat.  ‘Something else’ 
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can be ethnic ties, a past history of successful struggle, or an ideology.  When there is a 
single, dominant ruling party but no mass membership it is scored as a two, and when 
there is not ruling party it is scored as a one.   
The state refers to the regime’s security forces.  If its scope is high (3) it is 
extensive, specialized, well funded, and trained.  It has a medium level (2) of scope if 
there is a minimal presence throughout the country.  A low (1) level if the apparatus is 
underfunded, if there are wage arrears, and if there are extensive areas of the country 
where the coercive apparatus does not operate.  Similar to party cohesion, state cohesion 
is rated as a three if there is evidence of something else tying the members of the 
apparatus together.  It is assigned a two if there is no open disobedience, but there is also 
no something else; and it is assigned a one if the security forces have been non-compliant 
in the past.   
  To measure diffusion and its effects I look at if the electoral model is used before 
the elections and I look at how impactful it was.  The electoral model can be broken 
down into three constituent parts: International pressure to reform the elections, efforts to 
‘get out the vote’, and independent polling, exit polling, and parallel vote tabulation.  The 
goal of the model is to win fair elections if international pressure is effective and to get 
people out into the street if international pressure is not effective.  To determine the 
effectiveness of international pressure I look at the reforms that were undertaken before 
the elections; chief among them, if the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) included 
parity between opposition forces and pro-governmental forces.  Independent polling 
during and after the elections is easily scored.   
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Scoring the opposition’s efforts to get out the vote is difficult.  There are two 
problems: one is that there are a lot of ways that Bunce and Wolchik (2009a) argue the 
opposition uses to ‘get out the vote’.  At least a few of the strategies are used in each 
state, so they do not differentiate well between cases where the opposition uses the model 
to get out the vote and where it does not. For example, there were youth groups active in 
every state and before every election that I study in this paper: Pora in Ukraine; Kmara in 
Georgia; Magam, Yokh!, and Yeni Fikir in Azerbaijan; Kel-kel and Birge in Kyrgyzstan; 
Zubr in Belarus; and Hima and Sksela in Armenia (Schleifer 2008).  The second is that 
there are times when these strategies are used, but ineffective. Bunce and Wolchik (2010) 
fall prey to this problem.  In Azerbaijan the youth group Maqam works to get out the 
vote, but their efforts are not widespread.  Bunce and Wolchik (2010) score Azerbaijan as 
not having an opposition that conducts an ambitious campaign, even though the 
opposition attempted to use the electoral model to get out the vote.  
To differentiate between cases where the opposition used the electoral model to 
get out the vote, I score a state as using the electoral model to ‘get out the vote’ if the 
opposition has relationships with opposition groups that have already won power from a 
authoritarian regime.  The attempt has to be made during the diffusion cycle, which 
begins after the opposition’s success in Serbia in 2000 and ends around the time the 
opposition succeeded to win power in Kyrgyzstan in 2005.   I then measure voter turn-out 
against the previous parliamentary or presidential election and gather data on the size of 
postelection protests.   
To test each of these theories, I use the same dependent variable.  The factors 
each theory identifies as crucial have slightly different effects, which are captured by 
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answering the question: Did a member of the opposition become president.  Levitsky and 
Way (forthcoming) use their scoring system to determine if an authoritarian regime is 
going to be unstable or stable: The less stable it is, the more likely the opposition is to 
win power.  Bunce and Wolchik (2009a) argue that when the electoral model is used the 
autocratic government will be overthrown, meaning the opposition will win power.  
Hale’s (2005) is slightly less straight forward, he argues that autocrats are vulnerable 
when the incumbent is leaving power, but that does not guarantee that the opposition 
wins power.  If the incumbent is a ‘lame duck’, his popularity determines if he will be 
able to manage elections and get his chosen successor elected.   If it is high, then the 
successor will became president; but, if it is low, it is not guaranteed that the opposition 
will win power. Hale (2005) argues that if the chosen successor’s own popularity is high, 
then he may still be elected. This needs to be kept in mind when applying Hale’s theory 
to cases in the former Soviet Union, but the incumbent successor’s popularity was not a 
factor in any of the cases in this study.    
To test these theories I apply them to six cases of successful and failed revolutions 
in the former Soviet Union.  The cases are Armenia in 2003-2004 and 2008, Azerbaijan 
in 2003 and 2005, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and Belarus in 
2006.  I chose states in this region because the effectiveness of the theories that I am 
testing can best be isolated here.  Bunce and Wolchik’s recent (2010) article in the 
Journal of Democracy weighs the effects of diffusion against alternative explanations, 
including regime strength, but they include Croatia, Slovakia and Serbia in their 
assessment.  It’s not clear that these states have similar patronal presidential legacies 
from communism.  As a result, Hale’s regime cycle argument, which is based on the fact 
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that states in the former Soviet Union have strong presidencies and economic control, is 
invalid.    
Also, the location of Serbia, Croatia, and Slovakia, closer to Western Europe, led 
to the European Union identifying them as possible EU members. The attractiveness of 
EU membership combined with its requirements make isolating the effects of diffusion 
difficult. Vachudova (2005, 2010) argues that the desire to ‘return to Europe’ led to 
opposition groups uniting.  Popular support for these groups did not solely come from 
efforts to get out the vote, but from the popularity of their voting platforms. They 
reasonably argued that if they won elections, the state was more likely to become an EU 
member.  Weighing the influence of these factors against each other is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  However, the validity of Vachudova’s (2005) argument makes the effects 
of the electoral model unclear.    
Similarly, Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) argue that the location of states in 
central and eastern Europe like Croatia, Slovakia, and Serbia has created conditions 
where linkage between them and liberal democratic states is high.  When linkage is high, 
the effects of regime strength cannot be tested.  This is because regardless of the strength 
of the regime, it will fall when there is high linkage.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
Because of the limited amount of cases available to study the success and failure 
of electoral revolutions, it would be difficult to use a regression analysis to prove there is 
a correlation between the factors that these theories argue are important and the 
opposition’s successful seizure of power.  I have instead taken all of the cases that allow 
me to test these three theories adequately, and I am looking for the theory that best 
explains every case that I have selected.  Tables showing my findings regarding each of 
the three theories are shown below.  After each table, I give the reasons for why I score 
each state the way I do, then interpret the results.   
Hale’s (2005, 2006) regime cycle theory predicts if the opposition wins power in 
every case.  Levitsky Way (forthcoming) does not predict when this will happen in every 
case. There are also issues because the regime is only vulnerable when incumbent are a 
lame duck, and there is no evidence that the regime’s vulnerability is a constant as 
Levitsky and Way’s (forthcoming) theory predicts.  A more detailed look at the dynamics 
involved in their theory also reveals that they do not have their predicted effects.  Bunce 
and Wolchik’s (2009a) diffusion theory is shown to increase the amount of protestors in 
most cases, but those effects are not shown to independently lead to the opposition 
gaining power.   
Regime Strength (Levitsky and Way forthcoming) 
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Table 1 
 
High 
Leverage 
Security 
Force’s 
Strength  
Party 
Strength  
Total Out 
Of 12  
Does the 
opposition 
win power?  
Georgia 
2003 Yes 
Scope- 1 
Cohesion 1 
Scope-2 
Cohesion-2 6 Yes 
Ukraine 
2004 No 
Scope-3 
Cohesion 2 
Scope-1 
Cohesion-1 7 Yes 
Kyrgyzstan 
2005 No 
Scope-1 
Cohesion 2 
Scope-1 
Cohesion-1 4 Yes 
Armenia 
2003/4 No 
Scope-2 
Cohesion 3 
Scope-1 
Cohesion-1 7 No 
Armenia 
2008 No 
Scope-2 
Cohesion 3 
Scope-1 
Cohesion-1 7 No 
Azerbaijan 
2003 No 
Scope-3 
Cohesion 2 
Scope-3 
Cohesion-2 10 No 
Azerbaijan 
2005 No 
Scope-3 
Cohesion 2 
Scope-3 
Cohesion-2 10 No 
Belarus 
2006 No 
Scope 3 
Cohesion 2 
Scope-1 
Cohesion-1 7 No 
 
Levitsky and Way’s regime strength theory predicts how stable a regime is by 
scoring several different attributes.  Chief among them is the composite score made up of 
the security force’s strength and party strength.  Using their scoring system, the most 
stable state would receive a score of twelve, while the least stable state would receive a 
score of four.   A state’s level of leverage, whether it is a high leverage or low leverage, 
can referee between two states that have the same overall regime strength score.  In the 
sections below, I first explain my scoring, and then I interpret the results.  
Leverage 
Among these cases, I have scored every state except for Georgia as being low 
leverage.  Belarus, Ukraine, and Armenia all have received aid in the past from Russia 
and they have good relationships with the regime, so any punitive measures taken against 
them have not and are not going to be effective.  Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan are both 
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strategically important states: Azerbaijan because of their oil and natural gas resources, 
and Kyrgyzstan because the US has used an airbase in the country since 2001 to resupply 
troops in Afghanistan.   
Georgia is a high leverage country because the state’s relationship to Russia and 
because Georgia’s weak economy and military make the country dependent on external 
aid.  Both Russia and the US use aid and diplomatic, military, and economic pressure to 
influence Georgia: The US, to promote democracy, and Russia, to gain control of 
secessionist regions in Georgia, to keep a military presence within Georgia, and to fight 
Chechen separatists hiding in the Pankisi Gorge (Devdariani 2002). The US’s demands 
are easier to satisfy then Russia’s, especially because the type of democracy that 
Washington wants is not difficult to put into place.  Because Georgia still needs aid, and 
they cannot accede to Moscow’s demands, the US is in a position to pressure Georgia to 
be more democratic; especially because the US gives more aid to Georgia than to any 
other country in the world besides Israel (Anteleva 2003).  In 2000 Georgia received 169 
million dollars in aid from the US, which amounts to 47.9% of their government’s total 
expenditure (World Bank).   
State Strength 
Each regime’s security forces are rated on two different criteria for their total 
score: Scope and cohesion.  Unlike leverage, there is diversity among the scores these 
cases receive for both scope and cohesion.  Georgia has security forces with low scope 
and cohesion.  Unlike some of the other states in the former Soviet Union, Georgia did 
not inherit the military forces the Soviet Union had stationed there.  Instead, the military 
had to be formed from warring militias.  This took skillful maneuvering from President 
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Shevardnadze.  The pro-government militias had de-facto control over the government.  
When Shevardnadze returned to Georgia he had to force them to submit to the 
government, and they became the young state’s new military (Wheatley 2005, 70-87).  
After Shevardnadze’s security forces were cobbled together, the government’s priority 
was not to form them into a well-funded and trained force.  Instead, the government’s 
defense expenditure was the second lowest among these cases in 2000 (Fairbanks et al 
2001). Also, there were areas of the country that the security forces were unable to bring 
under their control (the Pankisi and Kondori Gorge) (Giragosian 2004).  Combined with 
the security forces low scope is low cohesion.  I scored Georgia as having low cohesion 
(1) because there was an attempted military coup in 2001 (Suleiman 2001). 
Kyrgyzstan is scored as having low scope, but medium cohesion.  Unlike 
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan’s security forces were formed from the Soviet Union’s army in the 
Turkistan military district.  However, the standing army and security forces that the 
Kyrgyz republic inherited were poorly funded, equipped, and there were few of them  
(Fairbanks et al 2001).  In Kyrgyzstan, the government also was uninterested in creating 
an adequate fighting force.  Out of all the states in the former Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan’s 
defense expenditure was the lowest at 51 million dollars (Fairbanks et al 2001).  Wages 
were rarely paid to the security forces, and when they were, they were inadequate.  
Though, after an incursion of radical Islamic groups in 2000, Kyrgyzstan’s defense 
expenditure did rise (Blank 2003).   Even though the security forces were poorly funded 
and equipped, there are not any examples of the military disobeying the government, so I 
have scored Kyrgyzstan’s security forces as having a medium level of cohesion two.  
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Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Ukraine all have security forces with high scope (3) and 
a medium level of cohesion (2). Belarus and Ukraine both inherited extensive, well 
funded, and trained security forces from the Soviet Union, and they made their military 
and security forces a priority.  Ukraine spent five billion dollars on their armed forces in 
both 2001and 2002(IISS 2003).   Kuchma’s government also extended the number, type, 
and size of non-military forces to the extent that they were larger than the armed forces 
(Kuzio 2000). There were specially trained units for anti-terrorism, anti-criminal 
operations, and crowd control.  These security forces created a surveillance network 
throughout the country (Durdan 2001). They were well trained, well equipped, and 
extensive security forces that do not have a history of refusing to follow orders to crack 
down on protesters or a history of disobedience.  Ukraine’s security forces are scored as 
having a scope of three and cohesion of two.      
Belarus also inherited security forces from the Soviet Union, and Lukashenka, the 
president, made defense spending a priority.  The government spent an estimated two 
billion dollars in 2001 and two billion more in 2002(IISS 2003). This amount is less than 
what Ukraine’s government spent on the security forces, but Belarus’s population is 
significantly smaller.3 There is also a surveillance network made up of hundreds of 
thousands of informants in every population center (Way 2006).  Among these forces 
there is not a history of mutiny or a lack of discipline, but there is no ‘something else’ 
tying the security forces to the regime.  The composite score for the state strength of 
Belarus is a three for scope, and a two for cohesion.   
                                                 
3
 In 2001, Ukraine was estimated to have a population of 48,816,000; Belarus had a population of 
10,054,000 (IISS 2003) 
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Azerbaijan is smaller geographically than Ukraine and Belarus and its population 
is less than both countries, but its defense spending was still high.  The government spent 
an estimated 850 million dollars on the military in 2001 and 900 million dollars in 2002 
(IISS 2003).  This amount continued to rise along with Azerbaijan’s rapid economic 
growth throughout the decade (2000-2010).   
Armenia is the only state that has a cohesion of three.  According to Levitsky and 
Way (forthcoming) if security forces have won a war, then that victory ties them together 
making them more likely to be willing to take extreme measures against protesters and 
the opposition in general. Armenia won a war against Azerbaijan over the region 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  As a result, I score Armenia’s security forces as having cohesion of 
three.  The scope of the security forces is a two because Armenia’s economy is not able 
to support the level of spending necessary for its security forces to have high scope.  In 
2000 and 2001, an estimated 650 million dollars was spent on the security forces in both 
years (IISS 2003).    
Party Strength 
 Among these six states, there were two regimes with dominant ruling parties: 
Georgia and Azerbaijan.  Shevardnadze, the president of Georgia, created the Citizens 
Union of Georgia (CUG) in 1995 after a new constitution was ratified.  In the elections 
after the constitution’s ratification, the CUG won a majority of seats in parliament, and 
dominated Georgian politics until 2001, when the party broke apart (Areshidze 2007, 69).  
The CUG penetrated all population centers in Georgia, but there was not mass 
membership, so it is scored as having a scope of two.  The party’s cohesion was also a 
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two because the ties formed between its members were based on patron client 
relationships, so the party was vulnerable to defection.   
 The Yeni Azerbaijan Party (YAP) was founded in 1992 and has been the ruling 
party in Azerbaijan since its chairman, Heydar Aliyev, became president in June 1993 
(Eurasianet 2005).  The party has been the official winner of all parliamentary elections 
since 1995, and its membership has continued to grow.  Party leaders claim that YAP 
now has more members than the Communist Party did in Azerbaijan4, and it penetrates 
all population centers in the small country (Figueredo and Taggart 2003).  For these 
reasons and because members owe their cohesion to the transfer of benefits and 
resources, Azerbaijan is scored as having a scope of three and a cohesion of two.   
 In the rest of my cases there is not a single, dominant ruling party, so the scores of 
scope and cohesion are both one by default.  
Interpreting the Results 
There are several issues with Levitsky and Way’s (forthcoming) regime strength 
argument.  It does not clearly delineate between cases where the oppositions wins power 
and when it does not.  There were three cases where the opposition won power in the 
former Soviet Union.  In two of them, Georgia (2003) and Kyrgyzstan (2005), their 
scores for regime strength were lower than the states that survived.  Georgia is a high 
leverage state and its combined regime score was six out of twelve. Akayev’s regime in 
Kyrgyzstan is low leverage, but it was the weakest out of all the cases:  Its score was four 
out of twelve.   The third failed regime was Kuchma’s in Ukraine.  There, the regime 
                                                 
4
 This information is available on the YAP website http://www.yap.org.az/view.php?lang=az&menu=0.  
There is a count of the party’s members on the title page. 
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score was a seven and the state is low leverage.  Ukraine’s score is the same as Armenia’s 
(7) and Belarus’s (7), and they are all three low leverage states.   
Along with not showing that the weaker regimes fell and the stronger survived, 
they also do not predict the timing of the elections as well as Hale’s argument does. 
Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) argue that a regime’s strength is something that is 
constant and unchanging.  If a regime is vulnerable, then it is vulnerable all the time.  In 
all of the cases looked at in this study, the opposition won power when the incumbent 
was a lame duck.  This means that there is no evidence the presence of a party or the 
security force’s attributes make a state any more stable when the incumbent is not a lame 
duck.  Furthermore, the specific characteristics that Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) 
argue are important for stability do have the effects that they predict.   
Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) argue that when a regime’s coercive apparatus 
has high scope, it can keep the opposition from mobilizing in large numbers.  The results 
have been mixed.  Kuchma’s security forces in Ukraine had high scope, but protests were 
larger than in any other of the cases, 500,000 to one million protesters mobilized (Kuzio 
2005; Aslund 2009, 191). Also, in two regimes with high scope, Azerbaijan (2005) and 
Armenia (2003/4), more protesters mobilized than in Kyrgyzstan, a state with low scope.   
 There is some evidence that a ruling party may smooth succession when an 
incumbent is leaving power.  In each of the states where there were opposition won 
power, the incumbent had not chosen a successor, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, or there was 
a failed succession, Ukraine. There was not a dominant ruling party in any of these cases.  
In Georgia, the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG) dominated politics before 2001, but the 
party fell apart in the face of the protests.  In the two states where there were successful 
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successions, Azerbaijan (2003) is the only one where there was a clear, dominant ruling 
party, the New Azerbaijan Party (YAP).  In Armenia, the outgoing president, Robert 
Kocharyan, had the support of three pro-presidential parties: the Republican Party, the 
Country of Law Party, and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Nelson and Katulis 
2005).  However, The Republican Party dominated the coalition and controls the majority 
of posts in the national and local governments (Nelson and Katulis 2005).  Kocharyan’s 
chosen successor was drawn from that party 
Diffusion (Bunce and Wolchik 2009a) 
Table 2 
 
Election 
Reform  
Exit 
Polling/ 
PVT 
"Getting 
Out The 
Vote" 
Protest Size5 Does the 
opposition 
win power?  
Georgia 2003 No Yes Yes 20,000-100,000 Yes 
Ukraine 2004 No  Yes Yes 500,000-1,000,000 Yes 
Kyrgyzstan 
2005 No No No 5,000-20,000 Yes 
Armenia 
2003/2004 No No  No  10,000-25,000 No 
Armenia 
2008 No Yes No 1,000-10,000 No 
Azerbaijan 
2003 No No No 10,000 No 
Azerbaijan 
2005 No Yes Yes 30,000 No 
Belarus 2006 No No Yes 10000-20000 No 
 
                                                 
5
 Estimates for protest size: Georgia (Mitchell 2009, 64; Wheatley 2005, 184;); Ukraine (Aslund 2009, 191; 
Kuzio 2005); Kyrgyzstan (Marat 2006, 129; Silitsky 2005); Armena in 2003/4 (Nelson and Katulis 2005); 
Armenia in 2008 (Grigoryan 2008c); Azerbaijan in 2003 (Ismailzade 2003); Azerbaijan 2005 (Valiyev 
2006; Momryk 2006; Aznar 2005); Belarus (Silitski 2006).  
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As stated above, the electoral model was first introduced to the former Soviet 
Union from central and Eastern Europe.  There, the model’s strategies all constitutionally 
removed long serving incumbents from power through elections, except for in Serbia.  
International pressure to reform elections and the diffusion of the electoral model gave 
the opposition the opportunity to seize power.  In the former Soviet Union, there have 
been no electoral reforms that made elections fair and led to a constitutional transfer of 
power without mass protests.  As a result, the size of the protests determines the success 
or failure of an electoral revolution.  Ideally, the opposition would use the strategies that 
the electoral model prescribes to get out the vote, and exit polling/parallel vote tabulation 
will encourage the opposition’s supporters to protest against the revealed fraud.   
Election Reform 
In the cases studied in this paper, there was no meaningful reform of the elections.  
By meaningful election reform I mean that the incumbent president’s administration 
continued to control the Central Election Commissions (CEC) in every case.  Before 
several of the elections, Georgia (2003), Armenia (2003), and Azerbaijan (2003), laws 
regarding the selection of the CEC did change, but not meaningfully.  Before the 2003 
presidential election in Georgia, the US pressured Shevardnadze’s government to hold 
fair polls.  The US threatened to withhold aid that was to be used for energy related 
projects (Antelava 2003), sent former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, former 
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, and Senator John McCain 
(Mitchell 2009, 12) to convince Shevardnadze to conduct fair polls, and the former 
Secretary of State James Baker met with Shevardnadze and proposed what became 
known as the Baker Plan.  The Baker Plan’s goal was to gain parity for the opposition on 
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the CEC.  Shevardnadze agreed to put the plan into place, but when the parliament 
drafted a law to implement the plan, the administration and parties loyal to Shevardnadze 
continued to control the majority if the seats on the CEC (Mitchell 2009, 49).   
 The electoral code in Armenia was newly amended before the 2003 presidential 
elections.  However, the administration continued to control the CEC.  The president 
nominates three members in the system and each of the six factions that won 
parliamentary seats in the last election nominates one.  There were three pro-government 
factions in parliament, giving the president control over six out of the nine seats on the 
CEC (OSCE/ODIHR 2004).  The president’s control over the CEC continued through the 
2008 presidential elections (Abrahamyan 2008). In Azerbaijan, the government increased 
its control over the CEC in the run-up to the 2003 presidential elections.  The law that 
was passed was also in effect for the 2005 elections (OSCE/ODIHR 2003; Aznar 2005). 
 Before elections in Belarus (2006), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) the 
government controlled the CEC and there was neither pressure for the opposition to have 
parity with the administration nor were there any changes to how the members of the 
CEC was chosen.  In Belarus there was a complete exclusion of persons nominated by the 
opposition at all levels of the election administration (OSCE/ODIHR 2006).  In Ukraine, 
the president chose the members of the CEC and the parliament does not have the option 
to approve each selection individually, instead they are approved en-masse (Article 19 
2004). Finally, in Kyrgyzstan, the president directly appoints, without the parliament’s 
approval, six out of twelve members of the CEC, and appoints the chairperson with the 
parliament’s approval (OSCE/ODIHR 2005). 
Exit Polling/ PVT 
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Exit polls and/or parallel vote tabulations were used in four of the cases that I 
score using Bunce and Wolchik’s diffusion theory.  These states are Georgia (2003), 
Ukraine, (2004), Azerbaijan (2005), and Armenia (2008).   In Georgia, the opposition and 
pro-opposition NGOs sponsored and conducted an exit poll and parallel vote tabulation.  
The National Democratic Institute (NDI) helped the International Society for Fair 
Elections and Democracy (ISFED) to conduct parallel vote tabulation (PVT) to deter 
fraud.  Two of the opposition parties, Saakashvili’s National Movement (NM) and the 
Burdjanadze-Democrats, headed by the two former speakers of parliament Nino 
Burdjanadze and Zurab Zhvania, hired the American company, the Global Strategy 
Group, to conduct parallel vote tabulation (Mitchell 2009, 45-46).   These polls all 
showed that the vote totals the CEC were reporting were inaccurate.   
 In Ukraine there was also a PVT, and several exit polls were used to check the 
government’s fraud and encourage voters to gather in the streets.  The Committee of 
Voters of Ukraine organized a PVT for each round of the presidential elections.  The 
Democratic Initiatives Foundation coordinated a national exit poll, which four polling 
arms implemented: the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KMIS), the Social 
Monitoring Center (SOCIS), and the Razumkov center (Mcfaul 2007). 
 In Azerbaijan in 2005, the first ever exit polls were going to be used to get out the 
election’s preliminary results quickly.  Three exit polls were conducted.  The USAID 
funded PA consulting group organized one exit poll.  The local partner that they used to 
conduct the poll, SORGUS and the Georgian company GORBI, may have government 
sympathies.  In a May 2005 opinion poll, these groups found that Ilham Aliyev, the 
president, had a 77% approval rating (Ismayilova 2005b).  The opposition claims that the 
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government hired the other two polling companies, SAAR and Mitovsky International.  
Interestingly none of the three agencies conducted exit polls in districts where the leaders 
of the three main parties in the Azadliq opposition bloc were contesting seats (Ismayilova 
2005c). 
 Before the 2008 presidential elections in Armenia the US agreed to fund an exit 
poll, but decided to rely on an Armenian polling agency, the Armenian Sociological 
Association (ASA), with close ties to the government to organize it (Danielyan 2008; 
ASA 2007).  After opposition groups protested the US’s decision, the exit poll was 
cancelled.  Without the US’s funding the ASA still conducted an exit poll with funding 
from pro-government public television.  In addition, the Civic Initiative Alliance 
conducted an exit poll along with Alfa GA organization (Chupryna 2008).  
‘Getting out the vote’ 
The electoral model is made up of three parts with different aims.  Pressuring the 
authoritarian regime to conduct fair elections is one part, using parallel vote tabulation 
and exit polls is another, and using new strategies to encourage voters to participate in 
elections is the final part.  Working to expose fraud, using PVTs and exit polls, and using 
new strategies to get out the vote are the core part of the electoral model, and they are 
what have been diffused in the former Soviet Union. To determine if the opposition uses 
PVTs or exit polls after elections is simple and straightforward.  However, determining if 
the new strategies were diffused and used to get out the vote is not.  I code a state as 
using the electoral model to ‘get out the vote’ when there is evidence the opposition was 
working with opposition groups that have already won power from an authoritarian 
regime.  Also, the attempt has to be made during the ‘diffusion cycle’. The cycle began in 
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the former Soviet Union after the opposition’s success in Serbia in 2000 and petered out 
after Akayev was overthrown in Kyrgyzstan in 2005.  Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), 
Azerbaijan (2005), and Belarus (2006) all fulfill these criteria.    
The overthrow of Milosevic in Serbia inspired opposition groups throughout the 
former Soviet Union to use their same strategies.  In Georgia, the Liberty Institute, 
brought leaders from the youth group Otpor to meet Georgian NGOs (Wheately 2005, 
179).  Otpor’s ability to mobilize the opposition and to gather members were seen as the 
primary reason Milosevic was removed from power (Kuzio 2006).  NGO leaders and 
politicians also traveled to states where there were unexpected electoral breakthroughs.  
NGO leaders from Georgia traveled to Serbia and to Slovakia. Three of the main 
opposition party leaders, Saakashvili from the National Movement, Gamkrelidze from 
New Rights, and Zhvania from the Burdjanadze-Democrats, went to Serbia to meet with 
political and civic leaders who were involved in overthrowing Milosevic (Mitchell 2009, 
124).    
Ukraine’s Orange revolution took place in 2004 after the Rose revolution in 
Georgia and the Bulldozer revolution in Serbia.  Orange activists benefited from the 
experiences of NGOs and politicians from both states.  Like in Serbia, a youth group, 
Pora, played an important role in mobilizing voters.  Pora was made up of two groups: 
Black Pora and Yellow Pora.  Black Pora worked to discredit the regime, and yellow 
Pora drew up a four point plan to mobilize voters before elections, and protesters 
afterwards (Demes and Forbrig 2006, 90).  Pora worked closely with Otpor in Serbia, the 
youth group Kmara, from Georgia, and had contact with civic resistance leaders from 
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Slovakia (Mcfaul 2007).  They also attended a summer camp before elections that 
members of Otpor held (Kuzio 2004b).  
Azerbaijan (2005) and Belarus (2006) also fulfill the criteria I outlined.  Before 
Azerbaijan’s 2005 parliamentary elections, the opposition decided to stage a revolution.  
The example of the Orange revolution in Ukraine inspired their efforts.   They selected 
orange as their revolution’s color.  Travel between Azerbaijan and Georgia also 
contributed to the electoral models diffusion and activists from Georgia were able to 
easily cross over and advise the opposition in Azerbaijan.  The government, however, 
worked to limit their contact.  A leader of Pora, Sergei Yevtushenko, traveled to 
Azerbaijan to participate in a conference on democratization.  He was an advisor to the 
foreign minister.  When he arrived in Baku, he was detained in the airport and forced to 
leave (Ismayilova 2005a). Said Nuri, a leader of the youth group Yeni Fikir was arrested 
after he returned from NDI sponsored training session in Poland (Ismayilova 2005a).  
Efforts to overthrow Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus began shortly after The 
Bulldozer revolution in Serbia. In 2001, youth in Belarus formed a group called Zubr 
(Bison), modeled after Otpor.  Zubr received the same training as members of Pora and 
Kmara, and directly participated in protests in Kiev (Franchetti 2006).  Before the 2006 
presidential elections in Belarus, there was a meeting of young activists who were 
successful or aspiring revolutionaries (Traynor 2005).  The Soros foundation also 
organized exchanges between Belarusian NGO activists, Polish activists, and Ukrainian 
activists in 2005, and the Soros foundation youth exchanges between activists in Slovakia 
and Belarus in 2004.   
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Two other cases, Azerbaijan (2003) and Armenia (2003/2004) were also within 
the diffusion cycle, but I do not score them as using the electoral model to get out the 
vote.  The Georgian example inspired Armenians to try and overthrow Kocharyan’s 
regime, but it was in 2004 after the presidential elections had already ended (Danielyan 
2004).  In Azerbaijan in 2003, the opposition was confident that they would be able to 
win power because Heydar Aliyev was dying and did not use any new electoral 
technologies (Bunce and Wolchik 2008).    
Interpreting the Results 
The diffusion of the electoral model does a poor job of explaining authoritarian 
regime stability in the former Soviet Union.  In Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) the 
electoral model was used and the opposition took power.  In Georgia, however, the 
electoral model was only one of a few factors that contributed to the opposition 
mobilizing after elections. In the third state where there was a revolution, Kyrgyzstan, the 
opposition mobilized and overthrew the regime without using the electoral model at all.  
In Azerbaijan, the electoral model was used without effect.    
The opposition’s efforts to get out the vote in Georgia were more limited than 
they were in Ukraine.  The youth group, Kmara, unlike their counterpart in Ukraine, 
Pora, had few members (Mitchell 2009, 54; Areshidze 2007, 98-99).  There were 
approximately 35,000 members in Pora and 3,000 members in Kmara. Jointly, with local 
NGOs and opposition political parties, Kmara tried to ‘get out the vote’, but voter 
participation did not rise.  It was at sixty percent in the 1999 parliamentary elections 
(Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1999) and it stayed at sixty percent in the 2003 parliamentary 
elections (Dieset 2004).  After voting, the exit polls and parallel vote tabulations helped 
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to mobilize protesters against fraud.  However, the initial protests for the first ten days 
after the elections were small.  At any given time there were only a few hundred to 
15,000 people there (Mitchell 2009, 64).  The opposition’s efforts certainly contributed to 
mobilizing protesters after elections, but there are other factors that were just as 
important.  Independent news provided constant coverage and ensured a steady trickle of 
new protesters, and Shevardnadze’s decision to ally himself with the hated ruler of 
Adjara, Aslan Abashidze, radicalized voters who would have normally stayed off the 
street (Welt 2006).  
In the other successful case of revolution, Kyrgyzstan (2005) the electoral model 
was not used at all.  Instead of the opposition planning protests, they began because 
individual parliamentarians mobilized their supporters after they lost elections (Radnitz 
2006, 2010).  An opposition party, The People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan, coordinated 
the protests that had already begun, but they did not plan protests beforehand.  Protesters 
took over cities in the south, Jalabad and Osh, and worked their way to the capital, 
Bishkek.  Similar to other attempted and failed revolutions, there were youth groups, Kel-
Kel and Birge, which were inspired by Pora in Ukraine and Kmara in Georgia, but their 
impact was limited because they were so small (Khamidov 2006).  However, like the 
People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan, they took advantage of ongoing protests and helped 
organize further protests in Bishkek (Marat 129).  Supporting the argument that the 
efforts of the People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan and the youth groups Kel-Kel and Birge 
did not use the electoral model is that voter participation in the second round of the 
elections dropped ten percent from the previous elections (Abazov 2003, 2007). 
37 
 
In one of the failed cases, Azerbaijan (2005), the opposition attempted to use the 
electoral model to overthrow the regime.  The chief issue when interpreting these results 
is deciding whether the opposition’s efforts were stymied in the failed cases because of 
authoritarian learning, or if the diffusion of certain strategies only makes a difference 
when combined with elite defection. In the two successful cases, Georgia and Ukraine, 
the opposition got out the vote and there was exit polling and parallel vote tabulations 
(PVT). In these states, the autocrat was a lame duck and the regimes are rated as weaker 
than in the cases where there were there were attempts to use the electoral model.  In the 
failed states, where efforts were made to implement the model, there is evidence that 
efforts were not as strong as the successful cases. This does not tell us much. However, in 
one of the successful cases, Ukraine, the president attempted to preempt the electoral 
model.  
Like making a case for diffusion, it is difficult to prove that Kuchma was 
attempting to preempt the electoral model in Ukraine, but was unable because of elite 
defection. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the strategies the government used 
effectively in Azerbaijan were used, but ineffective in Ukraine.  After the Rose revolution 
in Georgia, Kuchma went to Putin to discuss political developments. Afterwards, Russia 
explicitly supported the Yanukovych campaign to ensure that the pro-Western 
Yushchenko would not be elected.  Funding from Russia was estimated to amount to fifty 
million and three hundred million dollars (Petrov and Ryabov 2006, 152).   This money 
was spent on PR campaigns which, among other things, attempted to frame the Orange 
movement as part of a US plot to take over Ukraine (Kuzio 2005c).  In Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, and Belarus, Bunce and Wolchik (2008) argue that similar campaigns to frame 
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the revolutions were part of the reason why opposition movements were not able to 
gather the same levels of support as in Georgia and Ukraine.  The government also 
targeted the youth group Pora because youth groups played roles in previous revolutions 
in Serbia and Georgia.  They planted explosives at Pora’s headquarters to discredit them 
and frame them as terrorists who were trying to de-stabilize the country (Kuzio 2005c).  
The authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan used similar tactics against the youth group Yeni 
Fikir.  Members of Yeni Fikir found three hand grenades and a cartridge of TNT in their 
offices.  The opposition claims that the explosives were planted there to give the police 
justification to arrest members of Yeni Fikir (Ismayilova 2005a).  To hamper opposition 
efforts to mobilize after elections, Kuchma set up road blocks on highways from the pro-
Yushchenko West.  Police officers were in place, but they were unwilling or unable to 
stem the tide of supporters coming in. Also, in preparation for protests in Kiev, Kuchma 
wanted to keep protesters from setting up tents in the center of the city.  However, the 
mayor of Kiev defected to support the opposition and provided them with supplies, food, 
shelter, and waste management, helping instead of deterring their efforts (Way 2006).  In 
Azerbaijan, the government successfully forced protesters to hold their rallies outside of 
the center of Baku.   
Regime Cycle theory (Hale 2005, 2006) 
Table 3 
 
Lame Duck Incumbent Very 
Unpopular? 
Does the opposition 
win power?  
Georgia 2003 Yes Yes Yes 
Ukraine 2004 Yes Yes Yes 
Kyrgyzstan 2005 Yes Yes Yes 
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Hale’s (2005, 2006) regime cycle theory predicts when the opposition wins power 
in the former Soviet Union.  In each of the successful cases of electoral revolution, the 
incumbent was a lame duck and his popularity was low, leading to elites defecting and 
either the incumbent being overthrown in a coup, or his successor losing elections. In 
Georgia, the incumbent’s approval was six percent in 2001 (Frantz 2001).  Shevardnadze 
had built Georgia into a functioning state from anarchy, but his government was corrupt, 
the economy was growing weaker, and the country’s infrastructure and ability to provide 
basic services to its citizens were lacking.  Owing to his low approval rating, 
Shevardnadze had announced plans to step down in 2005 (Anjaparidze 2002). In Ukraine, 
Kuchma’s popularity was high and the economy was growing at unprecedented rates 
after economic reform in 2000.  It dove into the single digits when audio tapes were 
presented to parliament implicating Kuchma in the murder of a journalist, Georgiy 
Gongadze.  He had gained constitutional approval to run for a third term, but he decided 
not to.  In Kyrgyzstan, the incumbent became unpopular after the details of a deal 
between China and Kyrgyzstan became known to MPs in 2000 (Khamidov 2001).  
Protests began afterwards expressing mass discontent.  The government attempted to 
violently disperse protesters, shooting and killing at least six (ICG 2002).  Protesters 
grew in intensity in response to the government’s actions and they began to demand 
Armenia 2003/4 No No No 
Armenia 2008 Yes No No 
Azerbaijan 2003 Yes No No 
Azerbaijan 2005 No No No 
Belarus 2006 No No No 
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Akayev’s resignation.  Six months after the March 2002 shootings, the police were still 
busing protesters back to their homes in the provinces to prevent continued protests in the 
capital (Pannier 2003).   Notably, from the perspective of Hale’s theory, Akayev 
promised to leave power at the end of his term if protests stopped, making him a lame 
duck (ICG 2002).   In the other cases, Armenia (2003/4 and 2008), Azerbaijan (2003 and 
2008), and Belarus (2006) the incumbent either had not announced plans to leave power 
or was not incredibly unpopular.   
Interpreting the results 
After testing Hale’s (2005, 2006) Levitsky and Way’s (forthcoming) and Bunce 
and Wolchik’s (2009a) theories, I have found evidence that Hale’s regime cycle 
argument best explains whether, why, and when the opposition won the presidency in 
each of my cases.  However, the evidence that I found does not necessarily support his 
whole theory.  Hale argues that when elites expect a president to be leaving power, there 
is a period of contestation. Elites expect a president to be leaving power when he is 
seriously ill or dying, when he announces that he is going to be leaving power, and when 
his popularity is low. In these circumstances, elites expect that there will be a new 
president soon, and they support whoever the most likely candidate is. This weakens the 
incumbent and creates conditions where there is more political contestation than usual. 
When actually testing his theory, Hale finds that the incumbent’s popularity is the 
indicator of when an incumbent is in trouble.  When it is low, elites are likely to defect.  
The question then is: Do elites defect when the president is sick, dying, or announcing 
that he is leaving power, or do they only defect when the president’s popularity is low.  
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The way that Hale tested this theory only provides evidence that the incumbent’s 
low popularity causes elites to defect.  Regardless of the circumstances, whether the 
president leaves power because of his term limits (Armenia 2008) or if he is sick or dying 
(Azerbaijan 2003), the president’s popularity in each of these cases allowed his chosen 
successor to win elections. There is also no evidence of any more contestation between 
elites in circumstances where they expect him to be leaving power when he is popular. If 
there was more contestation, then election results would be closer to reflect the higher 
contestation.  This has not happened.6 Though, it is possible that if the president is 
popular, but physically unable to choose his successor, elites will defect to whoever they 
think the next president will be.  That does not happen frequently and has not happened 
in the former Soviet Union.   
In the former Soviet Union, there is only evidence that there is higher contestation 
among political forces when the incumbent’s popularity is low.  Even though the testing 
done does not support Hale’s whole theory, an incumbent’s popularity is still the best 
indicator for whether there will be contestation.  However, the relationship between the 
incumbent’s popularity and elite defection is not as simple as Hale makes it out to be. He 
argues that elites defect after they see that the president’s popularity is low. In each of the 
cases where the president’s popularity was low, there were also protests.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 In the 1998 presidential elections in Azerbaijan, the incumbent president Heydar Aliyev won 76.11% of 
the vote and when he was sick before the 2003 elections, his successor, his son, won with 76.84% of the 
vote.  Both presidents won elections after the first round.  In Armenia, in 2003, the president Robert 
Kocharian was elected in the second round with 67.45% of the vote.  In 2008 his successor was able to get 
elected with a majority in the first round (IFES). 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
A PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVE 
Elites do not decide to defect because they expect the president to be leaving 
power.  Instead, it is elite expectations about the incumbent’s ability to manage elections 
that leads to elite defection.  Elites form their expectations about whether an incumbent 
will be able to manage elections depending on how the incumbent deals with protest.  
The size, duration, realization of the protests goals, and the incumbent’s response to 
protests all give elites information about the incumbent’s popularity, the challenges the 
incumbent may face after elections, and the incumbent’s ability to deal with challenges 
from the street after elections.  Elite defection makes the regime vulnerable creating an 
opposition and giving the opposition the ability to win power.  
The core of Hale’s (2005) argument is correct.  Elites primarily seek to maintain 
or advance their positions, and these interests direct their decision making. For elites to 
maintain or advance their positions, they rely on the president in patronal presidential 
regimes. The informal and formal power that presidents have allows them to reward and 
punish elites depending on their behavior. Elites can only hope to counter a patronal 
president’s powers if they can work collectively. It is difficult to overcome this collective 
action problem, so elites usually support the president.  Hale, however, argues that there 
are times when elites stop fearing punishment and stop worrying about the president 
rewarding them with access to greater resources.  This happens when elites expect there 
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to be a new president.  I found that there is some evidence that Hale is right.  As argued 
above, there is only evidence that they expect the president to be leaving power when his 
popularity is low. However, I am skeptical that a president being unpopular is enough of 
a reason for elites to expect him to be leaving power. For example, before the presidential 
elections in Ukraine in 1998, Kuchma, the president, had approval ratings in the single 
digits (Darden 2001).   Using the government’s resources he was still able to win the 
elections and elites did not defect  
It is elite expectations about the president’s ability to win elections or to manage 
the succession of his chosen heir that determines if they defect.  The president having low 
popularity or a low approval rating is not enough of a reason for elites to expect him to 
not be re-elected or to not manage the succession. If a president has low popularity it is 
more difficult for him to get re-elected or to get a successor elected because he has to rely 
more on the menu of manipulation (Schedler 2002).  However, it can still be done. Fraud, 
intimidation, administrative resources, and control over the media are all effective and 
useful tools that can be used to create unfair conditions where victory is likely. In 
Georgia, Shevardnadze’s popularity was in the single digits, but it was still assumed he 
would be able to manage the succession process until something else happened: The 
Rustavi-2 protests.  
Protests can convince elites to defect or continue supporting the regime because 
of the information that they reveal (Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2010). In authoritarian 
regimes information on the president’s popularity is unreliable.  There may be no polls at 
all, the regime itself may sponsor ‘independent’ polling, and people also may falsify their 
preferences (Kuran 1995). The results of elections may also cloud elite perceptions of the 
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regime’s popularity because the regime can use fraud to ensure that they win.  Protests 
are a clearer indicator of the president’s popularity than opinion polls or elections. They 
can be unmistakable, salient, and powerful acts which signal to elites and citizens that the 
regime is unpopular.  
Along with protests giving elites information on how much support the regime 
has, protests tell elites that there are people actually willing to protest.  This is important 
because the president and his supporters will use fraud during elections to make sure they 
win.  In elections that may be close or when the president is unpopular it is essential for 
the president to commit fraud to hold on to power or to hand power to his successor.  
Without a politically active citizenry willing to mobilize, there is not much you can do 
against the president’s manipulation. If the masses are willing to go to the street in 
protest, then elites have a better chance of pressuring the president to hold fair elections, 
and they may be able to pressure the government to redo the elections, force concessions, 
or even to remove the president by force.  
The willingness to protest does not matter if the government demonstrates that 
they can withstand mass mobilization and can skillfully manage it.  The way the 
incumbent responds to protest tells elites if the regime is vulnerable to challenges from 
the street.  If the incumbent can keep protests small, keep them from lasting a long time, 
and if they can keep protesters from achieving their aims, then elites will expect the 
incumbent to be able to win elections.  The incumbent can commit fraud during elections 
and any protests would be able to be dealt with.    
Finally, if the information elites gather indicates that the president will have 
difficulty winning elections for himself or for his successor, protests are an opportunity 
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for elites to defect.  Protests express outrage towards something, and elites can show their 
agreement with the protesters aims by publicly giving up their positions in government or 
by leaving the ruling party or coalition.  They, then, can quickly win the loyalty of the 
dissenters because they were both ‘outraged’ for the same reasons.   
Because protests can change elite expectations regarding the incumbent’s ability 
to win elections for himself or his successor, the incumbent’s skill in managing protests is 
what partly determines if the regime survives or not.  If the incumbent does not have to 
manage protests at all, then the regime will survive and there will not be defection. 
Ideally, an authoritarian regime will deter participation in protests, making it less likely 
for protests to occur, and more likely that protests will be small.  If the government does 
face protests, then their ability to withstand pressure from protesters dictates whether 
elites will expect the president to be able to manage elections.   
Earlier in this paper, Hale (2005, 2006) and Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) 
discuss the incumbent’s ability to manage protests.  I came to several conclusions after 
testing both theories.  One is that outside of periods of contestation, elites will be able to 
order their security forces to crackdown on protesters.  The heads of the security forces 
are elites, like any other, and if they expect the president or his successor to remain in 
power, then they will not disobey orders.  Being able to use force against protester is of 
limited use if security forces are not well funded and trained.  In these circumstances, the 
incumbent would have to use deadly force against protesters to disperse them.   
Unfortunately, using extreme measures often results in backlash (Francisco 2005, 66).  It 
can lead to an increase in mobilization and not a decrease, which can overcome poorly 
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funded and trained security forces, even if they are willing to continue to use deadly 
force.    
The other conclusion that I came to was about the scope of the security forces 
(whether they are well funded, trained, specialized, and pervasive).  Levitsky and Way 
(forthcoming) argue that when a state has high scope, it will be able to keep the 
opposition weak and protests small.  Through looking at protest size and the scope of 
each state’s security apparatus, I did not find conclusive evidence that a security forces 
scope does dissuade people from protesting.    
A security force’s scope is necessary for an authoritarian to be able to manage 
protests, but it is not sufficient.  An incumbent may choose to negotiate with protesters or 
the incumbent may not use the correct strategies to manage protests.  Silitski (2006) and 
Robertson (2009) both argue that the strategies authoritarians use to manage protests and 
challenges to their regime determine their stability.  Silitski (2006) argues that Belarus’s 
president, Lukashenko, has preempted opposition challenges to his regime to maintain 
power.  Robertson (2009) argues that Russia has used proactive measures to deter 
protests.  They detain and harass organizers, warn participants in advance of negative 
consequences, infiltrate crowds with police informers, and block off potential gathering 
places in advance.   
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
Hale (2005, 2006) is the only theory examined in this paper that explains regime 
durability in the former Soviet Union.  However, there are issues with Hale’s regime 
cycle argument. There is only evidence that the opposition wins power when the 
incumbent is unpopular. There is not evidence that there is any more contestation when 
the incumbent is expected to leave power because he announces that he will leave power 
or because he is ill.  Levitsky and Way’s (forthcoming) regime strength argument did not 
predict where autocrats would be vulnerable to being overthrown, the cases were not 
shown to be weak outside of Hale’s period of contestation, and some of the 
characteristics Levitsky and Way (forthcoming) argue are necessary for stability do not 
have their predicted effects.  There is also evidence that Bunce and Wolchik’s diffusion 
argument is only able to remove an authoritarian incumbent during a period of 
contestation.  I’ve also shown that even without diffusion of the electoral model, 
autocrats may still fall if elites assume the president will be unable to manage elections.  
This does not mean that these theories should be cast off and forgotten.  The scope of the 
coercive apparatus in Levitsky and Way’s theory was not shown to have the effects that 
they predicted.  This means that there should be more research into the reasons for why 
scope did not work as intended.  Theoretically, it makes sense that regimes with more 
extensive, better trained, and equipped security forces should be able to manage protests.   
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Regarding diffusion, it does mobilize voters to protest after elections.  In cases where the 
incumbent is expected to leave power, it can also decisively decide the contestation 
period in the oppositions favor.  In Georgia and Kyrgyzstan the incumbent was 
overthrown before he could even choose a successor.  In Ukraine, the electoral model 
gave the opposition an edge in close race.    
 After testing each theory, I offered an alternative that exhibits elements of each.  
It is chiefly based on Hale’s Regime cycle theory, but I suggest that the protests against 
the incumbent and the government’s response are a better indicator of whether there will 
be a period of high contestation.  The government’s ability to manage elections partly 
stems from the scope of the security forces.  If protests occur and the incumbent manages 
them badly, then there will be a period of contestation. During a period of higher 
contestation, protests and the electoral model can give the opposition an edge.   
 This alternative theory does not precisely predict when an autocrat will be 
removed from power or when he will or will not be able to manage elections for his 
chosen successor. Instead it identifies when the regime is most vulnerable.  In these 
circumstances, the autocrat or his successor will have to rely on his own popularity, or his 
successors in order for the regime to be stable.  When studying protest and regime 
stability you have to account for a huge number of factors that can influence whether the 
oppositions wins power or not.  It is imprecise, even in comparison to other topics in 
political science. However, understanding which theories work, which do not, and being 
able to identify the period when an autocrat is particularly vulnerable is a step towards 
understanding this complex dynamic.   
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